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# Wi-Fi
MontaukOS drives Intel AX210-family adapters (the reference part is the AX211).
The driver scans, joins open and WPA2/WPA3-PSK networks, and presents itself to
the network stack as an ordinary Ethernet interface, so `dhcp`, `ping`, `nslookup`
and anything speaking sockets work over Wi-Fi exactly as they do over a cable.
```
wifi scan list nearby networks
wifi connect <ssid> <passphrase> join one
dhcp pick up an address
wifi status what you are connected to
wifi saved / wifi forget <ssid> networks remembered for next time
```
There is a graphical path too: a Wi-Fi entry in the desktop panel and a
Wi-Fi tab in the Network app. See "The desktop side" below.
## Layout
```
kernel/src/Drivers/Net/Wifi/
IwxTrans.cpp PCIe transport: MMIO, MSI-X, DMA rings, firmware boot,
host commands, RX processing, frame TX, key installation
IwxFw.cpp .ucode / .pnvm TLV parsing
IwxMvm.cpp post-ALIVE init, NVM, UMAC scan, RX dispatch
IwxConnect.cpp MLME: contexts, authenticate, associate, 802.11 <-> Ethernet
Wpa.cpp WPA2/WPA3-PSK supplicant (EAPOL 4-way + group rekey)
Ieee80211.hpp frame, element and RSN constants
Wifi.cpp subsystem facade: probe, scan table, syscalls, netif hooks
kernel/src/Libraries/Crypto.cpp SHA-1/SHA-256, HMAC, PBKDF2, AES, CMAC
kernel/src/Net/NetIf.cpp interface registry the Ethernet layer uses
```
## Joining a network
`SYS_WIFI_CONNECT` blocks until the link is up or the attempt fails, and
returns a `WIFI_ERR_*` code the `wifi` tool turns into a specific message
(wrong passphrase, unsupported security, AP out of range, and so on).
The sequence:
1. **Look up the BSS.** The SSID is matched against the scan table, strongest
signal first. If it is not there, one scan is run automatically and the
lookup retried, so `wifi connect` works without scanning first.
2. **Negotiate ciphers.** The AP's RSN element (kept verbatim in the scan
table) picks the pairwise cipher and AKM. CCMP is preferred over GCMP,
plain PSK over PSK-SHA256.
3. **Derive the PMK.** PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 over the passphrase with the SSID as
salt, 4096 iterations. A 64-character hex string is taken as a raw PSK
instead.
4. **Bring up firmware contexts.** PHY, MAC, binding and station, then one TX
queue on the management TID.
5. **Authenticate and associate.** Open-system authentication, then an
association request carrying the SSID, supported rates and, for encrypted
networks, the RSN element the supplicant built. Both are retransmitted up
to four times at 400 ms.
6. **Run the 4-way handshake.** EAPOL-Key messages 1-4, then the pairwise key
and the group key go into the firmware with `ADD_STA_KEY`.
7. **Report the link up.** Only now does `NetIf` see `wlan0` as usable.
## The data path
Once associated the driver translates between 802.11 and Ethernet II:
- **TX** - an Ethernet frame becomes a to-DS 802.11 data header plus an
RFC 1042 LLC/SNAP shim carrying the EtherType. The protected bit is set
once keys are installed and the firmware does the CCMP encryption.
- **RX** - the firmware decrypts and strips the MIC but leaves the 8-byte
CCMP header, which is skipped; the LLC/SNAP shim is replaced by an Ethernet
header built from addresses 1 and 3. EAPOL frames are diverted to the
supplicant instead.
One TX queue carries management frames, EAPOL and non-QoS data. The firmware
maps non-QoS data onto the management TID anyway, and the driver never
negotiates block-ack sessions that would need per-TID queues.
### Threading
The RX path runs under `IwxProcessEvents()`'s reentrancy guard and **must not
send a host command** - the command's completion is pumped by the very
function it would be re-entering. Anything needing a command (post-association
context updates, key installation, and therefore the whole EAPOL handshake) is
queued and applied from `IwxConnectService()`, which every idling core calls
and which is itself serialized. Transmitting is safe from either context: it
only writes a descriptor and rings the doorbell.
### Never wait on the clock under a spinlock
`kcp::Spinlock::Acquire()` does `cli`, and `Timekeeping::GetMilliseconds()` is
driven by the APIC timer interrupt. A wall-clock timeout inside a spinlock
therefore cannot expire: the counter never advances, the loop never ends, and
the machine locks solid with interrupts off - no mouse, no keyboard, no
scheduler. This is the same trap `ApicTimer.cpp` documents for the idle path.
`IwxSendCmd` holds a lock across a wait for the firmware's reply, so that lock
is a `kcp::Mutex` (which keeps interrupts enabled), and the wait carries a spin
cap as well as the clock check so it terminates even if the clock is somehow
stuck. It also bails immediately once the firmware is known to have asserted,
because nothing after that will ever be answered.
A firmware command that goes unanswered now dumps the firmware's own error
table on the first timeout - that names the command that asserted - and gives
up on the adapter after three, rather than stalling for seconds per command.
### Sample the clock after the work, not before it
`IwxConnectService()` sends host commands, and every one of them is a round
trip to the adapter that takes real milliseconds. Each step also stamps the
timestamp its deadline is measured from - `EnterState()` sets
`g_stateEnteredMs`, transmitting sets `g_lastTxMs`. A `now` read at the top of
the pass is therefore *older* than the stamps it is about to be compared
against, and because these are unsigned counters, `now - g_stateEnteredMs`
wraps to about 2^64 instead of going negative. Every deadline in the pass then
reads as long expired.
The symptom was a join that failed the instant it succeeded:
```
WiFi: [OK] Associated, AID 3
WiFi: [WARNING] Connection failed: timed out while joining the network
WiFi: [INFO] EAPOL frame received (99 bytes)
```
The two post-association context commands moved the clock forward, the timeout
check compared a stale `now` against the `g_stateEnteredMs` they had just set,
and the contexts came down before the access point's first EAPOL frame could
arrive - which is why message 1 shows up *after* the failure. So the clock is
read only once the command-sending work in the pass is done, and the
comparisons go through `Elapsed()`, which refuses to underflow.
### Teardown unwinds contexts in the order they depend on each other
Firmware 89 asserts when a context is taken away while another still points at
it, and the assert names the command rather than the reason. Three of these
have been hit so far:
| UMAC error | Cause |
|---|---|
| 0x2010330F | PHY binding and link activation folded into one LINK_CONFIG |
| 0x2010330E | link removed while its station still existed |
| 0x2000320F | link deactivated while the MAC was still marked associated |
The last one is the teardown side of the same rule. While
`MAC_CONFIG.is_assoc` is set, the firmware's MAC context owns the link carrying
the BSS, so `TearDown()` sends a `MAC_CONFIG` MODIFY clearing `is_assoc` first,
and only then removes the station, deactivates the link, removes the link,
removes the MAC and drops the PHY context - the order
`iwl_mvm_mld_vif_cfg_changed_station` and the paths below it use on the way
down. `tests/wifi/ap_mlme.py` pins that order.
### A bad access point must not become a bad computer
Three separate defects turned "the Wi-Fi connection went wrong" into "the whole
machine went wrong". They are worth keeping straight because they have nothing
to do with each other beyond sharing a trigger.
**The command wait is a busy spin on a core the scheduler has been told not to
touch.** `ServiceEvents()` runs from `ApicTimer::ServiceDeferredWork()`, which
sets `cpu->reservedForKernelWork` so a bottom half holding a process-context
mutex cannot be preempted into the process that would wait on it. The
scheduler honours that by refusing to place any process on that core and by
skipping it for the reschedule IPI, and on the BSP `RunBspMaintenance()` - the
thing that wakes sleeping processes - is not reached until the pass returns.
`IwxSendCmd` then waits for the firmware by spinning on `IwxDelayUs`, up to a
second. One pass of `TearDown()` is eight commands. Against an adapter that has
stopped answering, that pinned a core for the better part of ten seconds. The
symptom is not a Wi-Fi symptom at all: the cursor crawls, windows stop
repainting, everything stutters.
So a service pass now carries a budget - `IwxBeginServicePass()` /
`IwxEndServicePass()` - of roughly one command's worth of waiting in total.
Commands that do not fit are not sent at all (an abandoned command still holds
its ring slot, and a late answer would be misread as the *next* command's
completion) and are retried on the next trip round the idle loop. The bring-up
path does not bracket itself: it reserves its CPU deliberately and has nothing
to starve, so it keeps the full per-command timeout.
**Counting consecutive failures never fires on the failure that matters.** The
give-up rule was three unanswered commands in a row, with any success resetting
the count. An adapter that answers some commands and drops others - which is
exactly what a marginal link leaves the firmware doing - therefore never
reached the cutoff, while every drop still cost a full timeout. The stall was
not a one-off; it repeated indefinitely, and the driver never concluded
anything was wrong. It is a leaky bucket now: a failure adds one, a success
drains one, so a firmware failing even a fraction of its commands trips the
cutoff in bounded time.
**`IwxFwState::Error` was a one-way door.** Nothing anywhere cleared it. A
single firmware assert left `StartJoin()` returning `WIFI_ERR_NO_ADAPTER` -
which the user sees as *no adapter is ready* - for the rest of the uptime, and
the only way back was a reboot. Disconnecting and reconnecting could not help:
there was nothing to reconnect with. Since `IwxReadFirmware()` is idempotent
and the parsed image stays resident, the cure is to stop the device and run the
same bring-up again, which `ServiceRecovery()` now does. It is rate-limited to
one attempt per five seconds and capped at three, because the reset has its own
multi-second handshakes and an adapter that will not come back after three
tries is genuinely broken - repeating it forever would be its own kind of
stall.
### The link is up only while the access point says so
`IwxLinkUp()` was nothing but `g_state == Connected`, and nothing moved it off
that state unless the access point was polite enough to send a
deauthentication frame. An access point that simply stops being there - a phone
hotspot that sleeps, wanders off channel, or drops the station without saying
so - left the link reported as up indefinitely. `NetIf::Active()` went on
choosing `wlan0`, every packet went into the void, and the desktop showed a
healthy connection while nothing resolved and nothing connected.
Beacon loss cannot be used to notice this: once associated, `MacConfigCmd`
stops asking for beacons and the firmware tracks them itself. What is
observable is that our own frames stop being acknowledged, since `IwxTxComplete`
gets a status per frame. A long enough run of failures - with any
acknowledgement, or any frame received from the BSS, restarting the count -
means the access point is gone, and the link comes down so the stack can fall
back to a cable and the panel can report the truth.
The threshold is counted in frames rather than seconds on purpose: a link that
is merely idle has nothing to send and must not be torn down for it. And
`IwxTxComplete` runs inside the RX pump, so it only sets a flag; the teardown
happens in `IwxConnectService()`, where sending the commands it needs is
allowed. `tests/wifi/ap_mlme.py` pins both halves of that.
## The desktop side
### Nothing in the GUI may block
`SYS_WIFI_SCAN` sweeps for up to twenty seconds and `SYS_WIFI_CONNECT` waits
out a whole handshake. Either one called from `desktop.elf` would freeze the
compositor - and with it the mouse, the panel and every window - for seconds at
a time. So the same work has a second, non-blocking entry point:
| | |
|---|---|
| `SYS_WIFI_SCAN_START` | starts a sweep and returns immediately |
| `SYS_WIFI_RESULTS` | copies the scan table out without touching the radio |
| `SYS_WIFI_CONNECT_ASYNC` | starts a join and returns immediately |
| `SYS_NETIFS` | lists the registered interfaces (see below) |
`WifiInfo` grew the fields that make polling enough to follow along:
`scanning` and `scanGeneration` for the sweep, `joining` and `connState` for
the handshake, and `lastError` for how the last join ended. The GUI reads
`SYS_WIFI_INFO` every 400 ms while something is in flight and every three
seconds otherwise.
The deadlines belong to the kernel, not the caller: `ServiceAsync()` runs from
`ServiceEvents()` - after the RX pump has returned, so it is allowed to send
commands - and aborts a scan that overruns, tears down a join that stalls, and
records `lastError` when one fails. A failed join is unwound the moment it
fails, so `connState` is back to idle by the time anyone looks; `lastError` is
what survives to be reported.
### Wired and wireless are separate on the panel
The IP configuration is global to the stack, so "which interface does this
address belong to?" is not a question `SYS_GETNETCFG` can answer. `SYS_NETIFS`
reports each registered interface with its name, MAC, link state and an
`active` flag - the one `NetIf::Active()` currently sends through. The Ethernet
popup shows the address only while the wired interface is the active one, and
says "Not in use" when the cable is up but Wi-Fi is carrying the traffic; the
Wi-Fi popup does the mirror image. Each icon appears only when its hardware
does: no wired interface, no Ethernet icon; no adapter, no Wi-Fi icon.
The Wi-Fi icon stays white whatever the radio is doing. State belongs in the
popup, and an icon that changes colour next to the clock is just noise.
Picking a network that needs a passphrase opens a real window - created with
`desktop_create_window()` and the four callbacks, exactly like the reboot and
shutdown dialogs in `dialogs.cpp` - rather than something painted into the
panel overlay. It therefore has a title bar, can be dragged and closed, appears
in the window list, and gets its text field, checkboxes and buttons from the
same `mtk` widgets the settings apps use.
### What runs at startup
`desktop.elf` keeps looking for an adapter until one appears (firmware loads
well after login), starts one scan as soon as the firmware reports ready, and
when the results land joins the strongest saved network that is in range. Once
the link is up, and only if no address is configured, it spawns `dhcp.elf`.
### Saved networks
`0:/config/wifi.toml` holds them:
```toml
[wifi]
autoconnect = true
[network.0]
ssid = "Home"
psk = "passphrase"
```
**No default copy of this file ships in the image.** It is created on the first
save, the way `bluetooth.toml`, `display.toml` and `session.toml` are. A shipped
default looks harmless - it only documents the schema - but it is laid down
again by anything that refreshes the system files, and it takes the user's saved
networks with it when it lands. That is exactly what happened the first time
this was written, and it is why the schema is documented here instead.
`programs/include/montauk/wifi.h` is the one implementation of reading,
writing and searching that file, shared by the panel, the Network app and the
`wifi` command, so all three agree on the schema. The passphrase is stored as
typed because that is what the join needs - the kernel derives the PMK from it,
or takes a 64-character hex string as a raw PSK. There is no key store to hide
it in: anyone who can read `0:/config` can read the passphrases.
## The interface registry
`Net::NetIf` replaced the Ethernet layer's direct calls into the E1000
drivers. Drivers register a name, a kind, and three function pointers; the
stack sends through `NetIf::Active()`, which prefers a wired interface with a
link and otherwise takes the first interface reporting one. A Wi-Fi-only
machine therefore has no link until it joins a network, and a machine with a
cable plugged in keeps using it.
`SYS_NETSTATUS` reports whichever interface is active, so `ifconfig` shows the
wireless counters once Wi-Fi is carrying traffic.
## What is supported
| | |
|---|---|
| Open networks | yes |
| WPA2-PSK, CCMP or GCMP | yes |
| WPA2-PSK-SHA256 | yes |
| WPA3 transition mode (PSK advertised alongside SAE) | yes, joins via PSK |
| Group key rekeying | yes |
| WPA3-only (SAE) | no |
| Management frame protection required (MFPR) | no |
| WEP, original WPA / TKIP | no |
| 802.1X enterprise (EAP) | no |
| Block-ack aggregation, HT/VHT/HE rates | no - legacy rates only |
SAE needs finite-field or elliptic-curve arithmetic that does not belong in
this kernel, and MFP needs BIP. Both are rejected up front with a specific
log line rather than failing partway through a handshake. Mixed WPA/WPA2
networks that still broadcast under TKIP are refused for the same reason: the
pairwise key would install but every broadcast frame would be dropped, which
looks like a working connection that cannot get a DHCP lease.
## Crypto
`kernel/src/Libraries/Crypto.cpp` exists because the supplicant runs in the
kernel and BearSSL is a userspace library. It provides SHA-1, SHA-256, HMAC
over both, PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1, AES-128/256, RFC 3394 key wrap/unwrap and
AES-CMAC. It is not a general-purpose crypto library and should not be used
as one.
## Testing
`./tests/wifi/run.sh` compiles the shipping sources for the host against a
small shim and drives them from Python. It is the real `Crypto.cpp`,
`Wpa.cpp` and `IwxConnect.cpp`, not a copy, with only the transport stubbed.
- **Crypto primitives** against the published vectors - FIPS-197 for AES,
RFC 2202/4231 for HMAC, RFC 3394 for key wrap, RFC 4493 for CMAC, and the
IEEE 802.11i Annex H.4 WPA passphrase vectors for PBKDF2.
- **The supplicant** against an independent authenticator using `hashlib` and
`cryptography`: messages 2 and 4 carry MICs that verify under a PTK the AP
derived itself, the installed TK and GTK match the AP's, a wrong passphrase
produces a MIC the AP rejects, group rekeys and message-3 retransmissions
are answered, and RSN negotiation picks the right suites across eight
real-world information elements.
- **The MLME and data path** against a simulated AP that decodes every frame
the driver emits: the authentication request, the association request and
its elements (SSID, rates, capabilities, RSN), the handshake carried inside
real 802.11 data frames, key installation arguments, and the encapsulation
both ways - to-DS addressing, the protected bit, LLC/SNAP, sequence numbers,
broadcast delivery, and the filtering of foreign-BSSID and null-data frames.
Also the branches: open networks, retransmission and give-up when the AP is
silent, authentication and association rejections, and an AP-initiated
deauthentication bringing the link down.
- **Firmware context ordering** - the MLD command sizes and field offsets
against the decoded Linux trace, and the order the teardown unwinds the
contexts in, which is what the asserts above are about.
The harness clock advances on every host command
(`CMD_ROUND_TRIP_MS` in `mlme_harness.cpp`) rather than standing still. That
detail matters: a frozen clock makes every elapsed-time comparison in the
service loop trivially true or trivially false, and hid the underflow described
under "Sample the clock after the work, not before it" - the host tests passed
while the adapter could not join a network at all. Anything that reads
`Timekeeping::GetMilliseconds()` should be tested with time actually moving.
What is left needs the adapter, because it is the firmware's opinion rather
than the driver's logic: whether the firmware accepts the TX command and TFD
layout and actually radiates the frames, whether `ADD_STA_KEY` installs the
keys the driver asks for, whether the RX MPDU descriptor is read correctly off
real receptions, and whether association succeeds against a real AP's timing
and rate expectations. None of that can be exercised in QEMU, which has no
AX210-family device to emulate.