cleanup: comments in capabilities modules, default capabilities.toml, login
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@@ -12,22 +12,7 @@
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#include <CppLib/Spinlock.hpp>
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// A process that lacks an eligible capability can ask the user for it the
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// first time a syscall needs it. The request goes to the session's consent
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// agent (the desktop, which holds CAP_COMPOSITOR), which answers from its
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// stored decisions or by showing a prompt.
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//
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// This keeps both capability invariants:
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// 1. Authority only narrows down the process tree. A grant is bounded by the
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// process's consent ceiling -- what its parent could have delegated to it
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// at spawn -- and by the agent's own delegable set, and is only ever added
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// to the effective set. Consent defers a delegation; it never exceeds one.
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// 2. Capabilities are kernel-owned. The kernel identifies the program by the
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// path it loaded, never by a user name, and tells the agent whether that
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// path is protected by CAP_SYSTEM_IMAGE (only then may it be remembered).
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//
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// Lock order: g_lock, then the scheduler lock (inside the Sched helpers).
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// Nothing takes g_lock while holding the scheduler lock; the wait predicate
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// that runs under the scheduler lock only reads atomics.
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// first time a syscall needs it.
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namespace Sched::Consent {
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@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@
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# storage_admin, raw_storage, network_admin, set_time, user_admin,
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# display_admin, device_admin, log_read, system_image, compositor and "all".
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#
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# `effective` is what the program itself may use; `delegable` is what it may
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# pass on to programs it launches. The two are independent, and both are
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# clamped by the kernel to what the launcher can delegate.
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#
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# A grant only applies to a program under 0:/os or 0:/apps. Anything else can
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# be replaced by any process, so the kernel starts it with no capabilities.
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#
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# A program with no grant here can still ask for storage_admin, network_admin,
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# set_time, display_admin or log_read the first time it needs one: the desktop
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# prompts, and the answer is stored in 0:/config/consent.toml (docs/consent.md).
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# ==== System services (started by init) ====
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@@ -45,19 +45,9 @@ void build_console_args(LoginState* ls, char* out, int cap) {
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}
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void launch_session(LoginState* ls) {
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// Authentication already succeeded and the session is set, so the password
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// is no longer needed. Wipe it before the session runs rather than waiting
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// for finish_desktop_session, so it does not sit in the heap for the whole
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// session.
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montauk::memset(ls->password, 0, sizeof(ls->password));
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ls->password_len = 0;
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// A session may pass on what it holds and no more. Authority is never
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// propagated implicitly by spawn(): the desktop and the console both
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// consult 0:/config/capabilities.toml to decide which program receives
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// which subset, and the kernel clamps that to this set. A standard
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// session is delegable for the same reason an admin one is -- otherwise
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// its own terminal could not hand the shell the suspend it already has.
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montauk::abi::SpawnCapabilities caps{};
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caps.effective = montauk::user::is_admin(ls->username)
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? montauk::abi::CAP_ADMIN_SESSION
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@@ -113,10 +113,6 @@ extern "C" void _start() {
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while (montauk::is_key_available()) {
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montauk::abi::KeyEvent key;
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montauk::getkey(&key);
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// Deliberately untranslated: the login screen is US-English only
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// until it grows its own layout switcher. There is no user yet, so
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// there is no per-user layout to apply, and silently picking one
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// would leave no way to type a password in a different layout.
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handle_key(ls, key);
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key_changed = true;
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}
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@@ -128,16 +124,6 @@ extern "C" void _start() {
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first_frame = false;
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}
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// Event-driven wait: input_wait returns the instant the mouse or
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// keyboard ISR reports activity, so the cursor tracks the device with
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// no fixed-timer latency. timeoutMs is only an upper bound. Matches
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// the desktop's run loop; a plain sleep_ms() here cannot wake early
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// and makes every gesture start ~16 ms late.
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//
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// The login screen has no periodic UI (no clock, no caret blink, no
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// animation), so when idle it never needs to wake without input: pass
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// UINT64_MAX to block indefinitely and consume 0% CPU until the next
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// mouse/keyboard event, instead of waking ~62x/sec for nothing.
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uint64_t wait_ms = fast_mouse_path ? 1
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: ((mouse_changed || key_changed) ? 4 : UINT64_MAX);
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input_serial = montauk::input_wait(input_serial, wait_ms);
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