feat: add permission consent prompts, drop permitted capability mask

This commit is contained in:
daniel committed 2026-09-30 08:32:48 +02:00
1 parent c54181103f
commit ae5e84592d
25 files changed
+1632 -94

No files matched your search

+44 -9
View File
@@ -265,6 +265,13 @@ namespace montauk::abi {
/* Storage.hpp */
static constexpr uint64_t SYS_VOLINFO = 190; // (VolInfo*, maxCount) -> count, -1 bad pointer
/* Consent.hpp -- first-use consent prompts (docs/consent.md). Only the
session's consent agent (the desktop) may register, drain requests
and answer them. */
static constexpr uint64_t SYS_CONSENT_REGISTER = 191; // () -> 0, -13 lacks CAP_COMPOSITOR, -1 another agent is live
static constexpr uint64_t SYS_CONSENT_NEXT = 192; // (ConsentRequest*) -> 1 delivered, 0 none queued
static constexpr uint64_t SYS_CONSENT_REPLY = 193; // (requestId, CONSENT_ALLOW/DENY) -> 0, -1 stale id
/* Kernel-owned process capabilities. User identities may namespace
per-user resources, but never participate in authorization decisions. */
static constexpr uint64_t CAP_PROCESS_ADMIN = 1ULL << 0;
@@ -309,26 +316,55 @@ namespace montauk::abi {
"login grants it to the desktop directly");
static constexpr int SYS_ERR_PERMISSION = -13;
// A process holds two independent sets: what it may use (effective) and
// what it may pass to children (delegable). A launcher can delegate what
// it never uses itself, so neither set bounds the other.
struct SpawnCapabilities {
uint64_t permitted;
uint64_t effective;
uint64_t delegable;
};
// Both of the child's sets must come out of the parent's delegable set.
constexpr bool ValidCapabilityDelegation(const SpawnCapabilities& child,
uint64_t parentDelegable) {
return (child.permitted & ~CAP_ALL) == 0 &&
(child.effective & ~child.permitted) == 0 &&
(child.delegable & ~child.permitted) == 0 &&
(child.permitted & ~parentDelegable) == 0 &&
return ((child.effective | child.delegable) & ~CAP_ALL) == 0 &&
(child.effective & ~parentDelegable) == 0 &&
(child.delegable & ~parentDelegable) == 0;
}
static_assert(ValidCapabilityDelegation(
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, 0}, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN));
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, 0}, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN));
static_assert(ValidCapabilityDelegation(
{0, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN}, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN));
static_assert(!ValidCapabilityDelegation(
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN}, 0));
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN}, 0));
static_assert(!ValidCapabilityDelegation(
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN | CAP_SET_TIME, 0}, CAP_ALL));
{CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN | CAP_SET_TIME, 0}, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN));
static_assert(!ValidCapabilityDelegation(
{0, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN | CAP_SET_TIME}, CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN));
/* Capabilities a user can grant at first use through a consent prompt.
A consent grant never exceeds what the process's parent could have
delegated to it at spawn (its consent ceiling), is never delegable
onwards, and is issued only by the session's consent agent -- so it is
deferred delegation, not amplification. */
static constexpr uint64_t CAP_CONSENT_ELIGIBLE =
CAP_STORAGE_ADMIN | CAP_NETWORK_ADMIN | CAP_SET_TIME |
CAP_DISPLAY_ADMIN | CAP_LOG_READ;
static_assert((CAP_CONSENT_ELIGIBLE & ~CAP_ADMIN_SESSION) == 0,
"consent can only hand out authority an admin session holds");
static constexpr int CONSENT_DENY = 0;
static constexpr int CONSENT_ALLOW = 1;
// A request left unanswered this long is denied (and not remembered).
static constexpr uint64_t CONSENT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
struct ConsentRequest {
uint64_t id;
uint64_t capability; // exactly one CAP_* bit
int32_t pid;
uint32_t imageProtected; // 1 when writing the image needs CAP_SYSTEM_IMAGE
char imagePath[256];
};
static constexpr int USB_ERR_INVALID = -1;
@@ -837,7 +873,6 @@ namespace montauk::abi {
char name[64];
uint64_t heapUsed; // Distance from UserHeapBase to high-water mark
uint64_t cpuTimeMs; // accumulated scheduler runtime
uint64_t permittedCaps;
uint64_t effectiveCaps;
uint64_t delegableCaps;
};